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Abstract—Malware propagation poses a growing threat to net-
worked systems such as computer networks and cyber-physical
systems. Current approaches to defending against malware
propagation are based on patching or filtering susceptible nodes
at a fixed rate. When the propagation dynamics are unknown
or uncertain, however, the static rate that is chosen may be
either insufficient to remove all viruses or too high, incurring
additional performance cost. In this paper, we formulate adaptive
strategies for mitigating multiple malware epidemics when the
propagation rate is unknown, using patching and filtering-based
defense mechanisms. In order to identify conditions for ensuring
that all viruses are asymptotically removed, we show that the
malware propagation, patching, and filtering processes can be
modeled as coupled passive dynamical systems. We prove that
the patching rate required to remove all viruses is bounded above
by the passivity index of the coupled system, and formulate the
problem of selecting the minimum-cost mitigation strategy. Our
results are evaluated through a numerical study.
I. INTRODUCTION
The growing reliance on computer networks for commu-
nication creates a corresponding increase in the threat of
computer malware. Computer malware is an application that
infects and installs itself on a host, and then uses the resources
of that host to attempt to infect other devices. Infected hosts
often form large botnets that are controlled by one or more
malicious adversaries and used to mount attacks including
denial of service and spam campaigns [1]. Malware has been
growing in sophistication, with new attack vectors targeting
social networks [2] and mobile devices [3].
A variety of defense mechanisms have been developed
for thwarting the spread of malware. The standard approach
is to periodically patch hosts against known malware, thus
removing the infection and, depending on the type of malware,
preventing reinfection in the future. Proactive defenses include
scanning network traffic with intrusion detection systems to
identify malware signatures and quarantine infected hosts [4].
While each defense mechanism mitigates the spread of mal-
ware, there is also an associated performance cost, including
host downtime during patching, delays due to packet filtering,
and allocation of system resources to decoy networks. In order
P. Lee, L. Bushnell, and R. Poovendran are with the Network Security Lab,
Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Washington, Seattle, WA
98195-2500. Email: {leep3,lb2,rp3}@uw.edu.
A. Clark is with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engi-
neering, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, MA 01609. Email:
aclark@wpi.edu
B. Alomair is with the National Center for Cybersecurity Technology,
King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
Email:alomair@kacst.edu.sa
to determine appropriate parameters (e.g., patching rate) of
a mitigation strategy that balance removal of malware with
system performance, propagation models have been proposed
that describe the rate of malware propagation, the impact
of the attack, and the effectiveness of mitigation [5], [6].
These models provide an analytical framework for designing
a malware defense strategy.
Standard malware propagation models are based on epi-
demic dynamics such as Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible
(SIS), which depend on the network topology, scanning rate
of the malware, and probability that a scanned host becomes
infected. In general, however, propagation characteristics such
as the scanning rate are unknown a priori, leading to uncertain-
ties in the design of mitigation parameters. Such a mitigation
strategy could incur unnecessarily large overhead or fail to
control the spread of malware [7].
These uncertainties are especially pronounced when multi-
ple malware strains propagate through a network simultane-
ously. The interactions between different strains are complex
and inherently unpredictable. In the case of competing mal-
ware, one malware strain may install anti-virus software in
order to remove or block other malware from compromising
the same host [8]. Co-existing or colluding malware, in con-
trast, may reside together on a single host, and the presence of
one malware can facilitate other infections, e.g., by disabling
firewalls and anti-virus. At present, however, defense mech-
anisms that incorporate uncertainties in the propagation of a
single malware, let alone multiple co-existing or competing
malwares, are in the early stages.
In this paper, we develop a passivity-based approach to
modeling and mitigating multiple malware propagations, using
both static and adaptive defenses. By modeling the multi-
virus propagation, patching, and filtering as passive dynamical
systems, we develop intuitive rules for updating the probability
of packet inspection in order to guarantee removal of the
viruses while minimizing performance overhead. Our specific
contributions are as follows:
• We develop a passivity framework for modeling multi-
virus propagation and mitigation under SIS malware
propagation dynamics. We derive mean-field dynamical
models of multi-virus propagation Markov process and
prove that the multi-virus propagation and mitigation can
be viewed as coupled passive dynamical systems, and
show that the required patching rate is characterized by
the passivity index of the system. In the case when
the propagation rates are known to the defender, we
formulate the convex optimization problem of selecting
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2the minimum-cost mitigation strategy to remove multiple
viruses at a desired rate.
• When the propagation rates are not known to the defender
apriori, we consider the class of adaptive patching and fil-
tering based defenses. We propose two adaptive patching-
based defenses. In the first defense, we derive an update
rule that is guaranteed to ensure asymptotic removal of all
viruses in this network. In the second defense, we derive
a rule that can drive the probability of infection to be
arbitrarily low in the single-virus case while minimizing
the performance overhead of mitigation.
• We analyze two performance characteristics of our patch-
ing and filtering strategies, namely the convergence rate
of the network to the state where all viruses are removed,
and the total cost of mitigation. We derive bounds on both
characteristics as functions of the update parameters.
• We evaluate our approach via a numerical study. We
numerically verify the accuracy of the mean-field ap-
proximation by comparing it to the underlying Markov
stochastic model via Monte-Carlo method. In addition,
we compare the convergence rates under coexisting and
competing malware propagation and verify convergence
of the adaptive patching and filtering dynamics to the
desired steady-state.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the
related work. Section III presents the adversary and defense
models, and gives background on passivity. Section IV in-
troduces a dynamical model for the multi-virus propagation
and mitigation, and presents our passivity-based approach to
selecting a fixed patching rate when the propagation rate
is known. Section V describes and analyzes our proposed
adaptive patching strategies. Section VI discusses adaptive
packet filtering strategies. Section VII presents simulation
results. Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Malware propagation models have received significant re-
search attention in recent years. Standard approaches for mod-
eling propagation of a single malware are based on ordinary
differential equation models from epidemiology, such as the
Kermack-McKendrick model [9]. These models have been
extensively analyzed theoretically and empirically, including
applications to specific outbreaks such as the Code Red and
Slammer worms [5]. Eigenvalue bounds on the rate of malware
propagation, as well as the threshold rate for patching infected
nodes in order to eliminate viruses, were presented in [10].
Multi-virus propagation has also received recent study [11],
[12]. Propagation models have been developed to capture
features of specific application domains, including mobile
phones [3] and social networks [2]. Control-theoretic tech-
niques for designing optimal malware propagation and attack
strategies were presented in [13].
Dynamical models of virus propagation provide an an-
alytical framework for designing mitigation strategies. An
optimal control approach to mitigating a single virus is given
in [6]. Geometric programming techniques for selecting the
least-costly patching and vaccination rates were developed in
[14]. Defenses against malware propagation in time-varying
networks were considered in [15]. Recently, an optimization
approach to defense against epidemics with uncertain propaga-
tion parameters was proposed [7]. Under this approach, fixed
mitigation parameters were selected to ensure robustness to
propagation parameters within an a priori known range. Our
approach, on the other hand, adaptively increases the level of
filtering in the network and makes no assumptions regarding
the propagation parameters. An adaptive approach for virus
mitigation under budget constraints was presented in [16].
The preliminary conference version of this work [17] pre-
sented a passivity-based approach to modeling and mitigating
multiple viruses using patching-based defenses with a fixed
rate. The focus of [17] was design of mitigation strategies to
remove all viruses at a desired rate when the propagation rates
are known to the defender. It did not, however, consider the
case when the propagation rates are unknown to the defender
apriori. In addition, it only considered the impact of patching-
based defense mechanism but not the filtering-based defense.
III. MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
This section presents the model and assumptions of the ad-
versary and network defense. We also give a brief background
on passivity.
A. Adversary Model
We consider an undirected network with N hosts. We say
there exists an edge (i, j) if hosts i, j ∈ N can directly
communicate with each other. The set of edges are denoted as
E. A host j is a neighboring host of i if there exists an edge
(i, j) between i and j. The set of neighboring hosts of host
i is denoted as Ni. Given a network topology, we define the
adjacency matrix A as |N |×|N | matrix with 0 on the diagonal
entries and Aij = 1 if (i, j) ∈ E and Aij = 0 otherwise for
the off-diagonal entries.
A set of malwares V attempts to infect network hosts. Once
a host has been compromised by malware v ∈ V , that host will
send malware traffic (e.g., embedded in email, social media, or
other data flows) to non-infected neighboring hosts. We model
the arrival process of malware traffic of virus v as a Poisson
process with rate µv . In other words, the interarrival times of
malware traffic are independent exponential random variables
with mean 1µv . The receiving host becomes infected by each
malware packet with probability pS,v , depending on the set
of malwares S currently infecting that host. This dependence
is due to the fact that malwares may either install or disable
anti-virus software onto a host, thus changing the difficulty of
re-infection by a different malware.
A pair of malwares v and w can either be co-existing or
competing. If v and w are co-existing, then both can be present
on the same host at any time. If v and w are competing,
then malware v will attempt to remove malware w if it is
successfully installed on a host; hence, malwares v and w
will never reside on the same host. We let Cv denote the set
of malwares that compete with malware v.
3B. Network Defense Model
We consider two types of defense mechanisms, namely,
patching and packet filtering. In the patching-based defense,
each host is taken offline according to a random process and
is inspected for any potential infection. When an infection is
detected, the system administrator removes the infection and
brings the host back online. The drawback of this defense
mechanism is it could induce unnecessary cost of taking hosts
offline since the patching process will continue even when all
malwares are removed from the network since the inspection
and cleaning process is independent from the state of the
hosts. On the other hand, in the filtering-based mitigation,
each packet that is sent from one host to the other is randomly
forwarded according to an independent Bernoulli process to an
intrusion detection system (IDS), which inspects the packet
for malware signatures. If such signatures are detected, all
malwares are removed from the host that sent the malware
packet. Since a host is taken offline only when a packet that
contains malware is detected, filtering-based mitigation avoids
unnecessary cost. However, since the infected host will only
send malware traffic to uninfected hosts, the filtering will not
be able to detect any infection when all hosts are infected.
In this paper, we consider a susceptible-infected-susceptible
(SIS) model [18],where patched hosts can be reinfected at
a later time. In the patching defense, each host i is taken
offline according to a Poisson process with rate βi, and patched
against all known malwares. That is, the times between two
consecutive patching for host i are modeled as independent
exponential random variables with mean 1βi . In the packet
filtering defense, we assume each packet that is sent from host
i to host j is randomly forwarded with probability q to an IDS.
The parameters βi and q vary over time, and are assumed to be
set by a centralized entity, which is notified when a malware
packet or infected host is detected.
C. Background on Passivity
This section gives background on passivity. All definitions
can be found in [19].
Definition 1: A dynamical system represented by the state
model x˙(t) = f(x(t), u(t)), y(t) = h(x(t), u(t)), where
f : Rn×Rp → Rn is locally Lipschitz, and y : Rn×Rp → Rp
is continuous, is called passive if there exists a continuously
differentiable positive semidefinite function W (storage func-
tion) such that
W˙ (t) ≤ uT y. (1)
If there exists a parameter ρ such that
W˙ (t) ≤ ρyT y + uT y (2)
for all t, then the system is called output feedback passive
(OFP).
A subclass of output feedback passive systems is output
strictly passive systems. A dynamical system is output strictly
passive if ρ < 0. The smallest ρ that satisfies the condition
(2) is defined as the output feedback passivity index of
the system. If there exists a symmetric matrix Q such that
W˙ (t) ≤ y(t)TQy(t) + u(t)T y(t) then the output feedback
passivity index ρ is upper bounded by ρ ≤ µ1(Q), where µ1
denotes the largest eigenvalue of Q.
Definition 2: Given a dynamical system x˙(t) = f(x(t))
with x(0) = x0, where f : D → Rn for the domain D ⊂ Rn,
is a locally Lipschitz function in x, an equilibrium point x∗ is
exponentially stable with rate of convergence α if there exist
positive constants c and α such that
||x(t)− x∗|| ≤ c exp (−αt)||x0||
for all initial states x0 ∈ D.
The following theorem gives a condition for exponential
stability as well as bounds on the parameters c and α.
Theorem 1: Let x˙(t) = f(x(t)) be a dynamical system
with equilibrium point x∗. Suppose that there exists a positive
semidefinite function W such that W (x∗) = 0 and positive
constants c1, c2, c3, and p such that
c1||x− x∗||p ≤ W (x) ≤ c2||x− x∗||p,
W˙ ≤ −c3||x− x∗||p.
Then x∗ is exponentially stable with ||x(t) − x∗|| upper
bounded by
||x(t)− x∗|| ≤
(
c2
c1
)1/p
exp
(
− c3
pc1
t
)
||x0||.
The following two theorems provide sufficient conditions for
asymptotic convergence.
Theorem 2: [19] The negative feedback interconnection of
two strictly passive systems W˙1 ≤ uT1 y1 and W˙2 ≤ uT2 y2
where u2 = y1 and u1 = −y2 is asymptotically stable.
The following corollary follows directly from Definition 1 and
Theorem 1.
Corollary 1: [19] Let x˙(t) = f(x(t), u(t)), y(t) = x(t)
be an OFP system with equilibrium point x∗ = 0 admitting
a quadratic storage function W (x) = 12x
Tx. Let the OFP
passivity index be ρ. Then u = −(ρ + )x will guarantee
exponential stability with convergence rate .
Theorem 3: [19] LaSalle’s Invariance Principle: Given
a set Ω ⊂ D that is positively invariant with respect to
dynamics x˙ = f(x), and W : D → R being a continuously
differentiable function such that W˙ (x) < 0 in Ω, every
solution starting in Ω will converge to the largest invariant set
M ⊂ I where I is the set of points in Ω such that W˙ (x) = 0.
IV. MULTI-VIRUS PROPAGATION DYNAMICS
In this section, a Markov model for malware propagation
and mitigation is formulated. A state-space dynamical model
is derived using a mean-field approximation of the Markov
propagation model. We then prove that the propagation model
is output feedback passive, as a first step towards a passivity-
based approach to designing a mitigation strategy. We formu-
late the problem of selecting a static patching rate when the
propagation parameters are known.
4A. Markov Model and Mean-Field Approximation
The time-varying components of the system model de-
fined in Section III consist of the set of malwares infecting
each host i at time t, denoted Si(t) ⊆ V , as well as the
patching rate βi(t) of each host i and the probability of
packet filtering, denoted q(t). The quantities βi(t) and q(t)
vary over time due to the adaptive defense. Taken together,
S(t) = (S1(t), . . . , Sn(t), β1(t), . . . , βn(t), q(t)) comprises
the state of the system.
Due to the Poisson assumption on the infection and patching
rates, the state S(t) defines a continuous-time Markov chain
with the following transition rates. For malware v, each in-
fected host sends malware packets to each uninfected neighbor
with rate µv . When a host i receives a packet infected with
malware v at time t, host i becomes infected with malware
v and all competing viruses (i.e., Si(t) ∩ Cv) are removed
with probability p(Si(t), v). Host i’s transition rate from being
infected with a set of viruses Si(t) to being infected with
Si(t)\Cv∪{v} due to a single neighbor infected with virus v
is denoted λS,v , p(S, v)µv . Throughout this paper, we define
λmax = maxS,v λ
S,v and λmin = minS,v λS,v .
Transitions due to the filtering process are described as
follows. For any malware v with v ∈ Si(t) \ Sj(t) with
j ∈ Ni, host i sends malware packets to j with rate µv , which
are inspected with probability q(t). If the malware packet is
forwarded to IDS, then the host i is taken offline and all
malwares in Si(t) are removed, resulting in a transition from
Si(t) to ∅ with rate λv(t) , q(t)µv . The last type of transition
occurs due to the patching process. This results in a transition
from Si(t) to ∅ with rate βi(t).
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Fig. 1. Illustration of possible transitions with two malwares 1 and 2 that are
coexisting. If S = {1}, then (a) is the transition into set S by being infected
with malware 1, (b) is the transition away from S by being additionally
infected with malware 2, and (c), (d) is the transition away from set S due
to patching and filtering respectively.
The Markov model defined in this fashion has a number of
states that is exponential in the number of hosts and malwares.
Instead of dealing directly with all possible combinations of
states Si(t), which is computationally infeasible for large net-
works, we consider the average probability of infection for the
tractability of analysis by applying mean-field approximation
analogous to [9], [11], [20]. The mean-field model is described
by the states {xSi (t) : i ∈ N,S ⊆ V }, defined as the
probability that host i is infected with a set of viruses S at
time t. In describing the mean-field dynamics, we first observe
that the set of subsets of V that can transition to a set S is
given by ⋃
v∈S
{(S \ {v}) ∪R : R ⊆ Cv} ⊂ 2V
where 2V is the power set of the set V . Using the Kolmogorov
forward equation [21], the net transitions into state Si are
described by
x˙Si (t)
=
∑
v∈S
∑
R⊆Cv
∑
j∈Ni
∑
T⊂V :T3v
[
λ(S\{v}∪R,v) (3)
× Pr(Si(t) = S \ {v} ∪R,Sj(t) = T )]
−
∑
v/∈S
∑
j∈Ni
∑
T3v
[
λS,v Pr(Si(t) = S, Sj(t) = T )] (4)
−
∑
v∈S
∑
j∈Ni
∑
T :v/∈T
λ
v
(t)Pr(Si(t) = S, Sj(t) = T ) (5)
−βi(t)xSi (t). (6)
In the above, Eq. (3) describes transitions to S due to
infection, while Eq. (4) describes transitions from S due to
infection with viruses not in S. Eqs. (5) and (6) describe the
impact of filtering and patching, respectively (Transitions (a),
(b) and (c,d) respectively in Figure 1).
1) Independence Approximation and its Implication:
Throughout this paper, we make an independence assumption
that Pr(Si(t) = S, Sj(t) = T ) = xSi x
T
j for all i, j, S, and T .
With this assumption, the dynamics of xSi (t) are rewritten as
x˙Si (t) =
∑
v∈S
∑
R⊆Cv
∑
j∈Ni
∑
T3v
λ(S\{v}∪R,v)xS\{v}∪Ri x
T
j (7)
−
∑
v/∈S
∑
j∈Ni
∑
T3v
λS,vxSi x
T
j (8)
−
∑
v∈S
∑
j∈Ni
∑
T :v/∈T
λ
v
(t)xSi x
T
j − βi(t)xSi (t). (9)
This independence assumption is common in models of
malware propagation [18], [20]. In the case of single virus
propagation, this assumption is known to overestimate the
mean-field propagation dynamics [20] under the assumption
Pr(Si = ∅|Sj = {v}) ≤ Pr(Si = ∅). (10)
In other words, conditioned on the event that a neighboring
host j of host i is infected, it cannot increase the probability
that i is clean. Since the independence assumption overesti-
mates the propagation dynamics, it implies that any mitigation
strategy that is sufficient to remove all malwares with the
independence assumption is also sufficient to remove all
malwares for the underlying mean-field dynamics. Recently, in
the case of competing multi-virus propagation, it was shown
[18] that the independence assumption does not systematically
over or under estimate the propagation dynamics of individual
malware propagation (equations (7) and (8)). On the other
hand, if the goal of the defender is to remove all malwares,
not the individual malware, then it suffices to consider the
dynamics of x¯i(t) =
∑
S⊂V :S 6=∅ x
S
i , the probability that host
i is infected with at least one malware at time t. The following
theorem shows that the conditional probability assumption (10)
results in over-estimation of mean field dynamics of x¯i(t).
Theorem 4: Consider the propagation dynamics of x¯i(t) in
the absence of mitigation strategy given as
x˙i = (1− xi)
∑
j∈Ni
∑
v∈V
λ∅,v xvj . (11)
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Fig. 2. Representation of our passivity-based approach, consisting of coupled
dynamical systems representing propagation, filtering, and patching.
The dynamics (11) provides an upperbound on the mean-field
dynamics of x¯i.
Proof: Define x¯vi =
∑
S3v x
S
i , the probability that host
i is infected with malware v at time t, and γS→S
′
i (t) as the
transition rate of being infected with set of viruses S
′
from
being infected with S. 1Si(t)=S is an indicator which equals
to 1 if node i is infected with set of viruses S and 0 otherwise.
Then from equations (7), (8), we have
˙¯xi(t) =
∑
S⊂V :S 6=∅
E[
∑
S′ 6=S
1Si(t)=S′γ
S
′→S
i (t)]
− E[
∑
S′ 6=S:S′ 6=∅
1Si(t)=Sγ
S→S′
i (t)]
=
∑
v∈V
E[1Si(t)=∅
∑
j∈Ni
∑
S3v
λ∅,v1Sj(t)=S ]
= E[1Si(t)=∅
∑
j∈Ni
∑
v∈V
∑
S3v
λ∅,v1Sj(t)=S ]
≤ (1− x¯i(t))
∑
j∈Ni
∑
v∈V
λ∅,vx¯vj .
where the last inequality is from the assumption (10).
In Section VII, we empirically analyze the accuracy of our
approximate dynamical model showing that the mean-field
dynamics closely follow the underlying Markov process.
B. Passivity Analysis of Malware Propagation
Our passivity-based analysis of malware propagation and
mitigation decomposes the propagation model into three cou-
pled dynamical systems, namely, multi-virus propagation,
filtering-based mitigation, and patching based mitigation (Fig-
ure 2). The first step in developing our approach is to prove
that the propagation dynamics (top block) are output feedback
passive.
As a preliminary, we have the following result that provides
a storage function for the set of dynamical systems from the
mean-field dynamics.
Lemma 1: Consider a finite set V , and the set of state
dynamics given as
x˙S = −
∑
T 6=S
γS→T (t)xS(t) +
∑
T 6=S
γT→S(t)xT (t)
for S, T ⊂ V . Given a quadratic function W =
1
2
∑
S⊂V (x
S)2, we have
W˙ =
∑
T 6=S
∑
S⊂V
γS→T (t)
(−(xS)2(t) + xS(t)xT (t)) .
Proof:
W˙ =
∑
S
xS x˙S
=
∑
S
−∑
T 6=S
γS→T (t)(xS)2 +
∑
T 6=S
γT→S(t)xSxT

=
∑
T 6=S
∑
S⊂V
γS→T (t)
(−(xS)2(t) + xS(t)xT (t))
In what follows, we analyze the storage function
Wi(x) =
1
2
∑
S 6=∅
(xSi )
2
using the results of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2: Define ui = −βixi, and xi as a column vector of
length 2|V |− 1 where entries enumerate {xSi } for all possible
subset S ⊂ V \ ∅. The time derivative of Wi(x) is given by
W˙i ≤ xTi Qixi +
∑
j∈Ni
xTj Qxj + u
T
i xi,
where Qi is a diagonal matrix with diagonal entry correspond-
ing to host i’s state being S. The diagonal entries of Qi are
written as
Qi(S, S) =
|Ni|
6
∑
v∈S
∑
R⊆Cv
2|V \Cv|−1λS\{v}∪R,v
and Q = HΛHT . Here H is a 2|V | × |V | 0-1 matrix where
each entry HS,v corresponds to set S (row) and malware v
(column), which equals to 1 if v ∈ S and 0 otherwise, and Λ
is a |V | × |V | diagonal matrix with
Λvv =
1
12
∑
S:v/∈S
λS,v.
Proof: Let R be the set of realizable sets where for S ∈
R, if v ∈ S then for any u ∈ Cv , u 6∈ S. By Lemma 1, W˙i(x)
is equal to
W˙i =
∑
S∈R
∑
v∈S
∑
R⊆Cv
[
γS\{v}∪R→S(t)(−(xS\{v}∪Ri )2
+x
S\{v}∪R
i x
S
i )
]
≤ 1
4
∑
S∈R
∑
v∈S
∑
R⊆Cv
[
γS\{v}∪R→S(t)(xSi )
2
]
,
6where the inequality follows from the identity (2xS\{v}∪Ri −
xSi )
2 ≥ 0. Since γS\{v}∪R→S(t) =
∑
nj∈Ni λ
S\{v}∪R,vxvj ,
we have
W˙i ≤ 1
4
∑
S∈R
∑
v∈S
∑
R⊆Cv
∑
nj∈Ni
λS\{v}∪R,v xvj (x
S
i )
2
≤ 1
12
∑
S∈R
∑
v∈S
∑
R⊆Cv
∑
j∈Ni
λS\{v}∪R,v (xvj )
2
+
1
6
∑
S∈R
∑
v∈S
∑
R⊆Cv
∑
j∈Ni
λS\{v}∪R,v (xSi )
2
by the inequality abc ≤ 13 (a2 + b2 + c2). We can simplify the
the first term as follows:∑
S∈R
∑
v∈S
∑
R⊆Cv
∑
j∈Ni
λS\{v}∪R,v (xvj )
2
=
∑
v∈S
∑
S∈R:
v∈S
∑
R⊆Cv
∑
j∈Ni
λS\{v}∪R,v (xvj )
2
=
∑
v∈S
∑
j∈Ni
[
(xvj )
2
( ∑
S∈R:v/∈S
λS\{v},S
)]
.
The last equivalence relationship follows from the observation
that each set T ∈ R with v /∈ T appears exactly once in the
collection C = {(S \ {v} ∪R : S ∈ R, R ⊆ Cv}. To see this,
let T ∈ R be a set with v /∈ T . Let S = (T \ Cv) ∪ {v} and
R = T ∩Cv . We have T = S ∪R \ {v}, which appears in the
collection C.
Now, suppose that there exist S′ and R′ with v ∈ S′, S′ ∈
R, R′ ⊆ Cv , T = S′ ∪R′ \ {v}, and S′ 6= S or R′ 6= R. We
have four cases. First, if S′ 6= S and there exists u ∈ S′ \ S,
then we must have u ∈ R. However, u ∈ R ⊆ Cv , and
hence u and v are both in S′, contradicting the assumption
that S′ ∈ R.
Second, suppose that u ∈ S \ S′. By a similar argument,
we must have u′ ∈ R′ ⊆ Cv , creating a contradiction by the
same argument.
Third, suppose that there exists u ∈ R′ \R. We must have
u ∈ S, however, u ∈ Cv , creating a contradiction since u, v ∈
S and S ∈ R. Finally, the case where there exists u ∈ R \R′
is similar.
This yields
W˙i ≤ 1
12
∑
j∈Ni
∑
v∈V
( ∑
S:v/∈S
λS,v
)( ∑
T :v∈T
xTj
)2
+
|Ni|
6
∑
S∈R
∑
v∈S
∑
R⊆Cv
λS\{v}∪R,v
 (xSi )2.
Two special cases are a set of competing viruses, in which
Cv = V \ {v} for all v ∈ V , and coexisting viruses, in which
Cv = ∅ for all v ∈ V . In the coexisting virus case,
Qi(S, S) =
|Ni|
6
∑
v∈S
2|V |−1λS\{v},v,
while in the competing case
Qi(S, S) =
|Ni|
6
∑
u 6=v
λu,v + λ∅,v
 .
In general, the passivity index in the competing case will
be less than the passivity index in the coexisting case since
the exponential term 2|V |−1 will increase exponentially as the
number of malwares increase.
The following theorem implies that the multi-virus propaga-
tion is output-feedback passive, and hence that passivity-based
techniques can be developed to design a mitigation strategy
from Corollary 1.
Theorem 5: The mean-field approximation (7)–(9) of the
multi-virus propagation dynamics without filtering (λ¯v = 0)
is output feedback passive from input (ui = −βixi : i ∈ N)
to output (xi : i ∈ N), with passivity index ρ bounded by
ρ ≤ max
i
{µ1(Qi + |Ni|Q)} ,
where µ1(·) denotes the largest eigenvalue of a matrix.
Proof: Select the storage function W (x) =
∑
i∈N Wi(x).
By Lemma 2,
W˙ (x) =
∑
i∈N
W˙i ≤
∑
i∈N
xTi Qixi +
∑
i
∑
j∈Ni
xTj Qxj +
∑
i∈N
uTi xi
=
∑
i∈N
xTi Qixi +
∑
i
|Ni|xTi Qxi +
∑
i∈N
uTi xi
=
∑
i∈N
xTi (Qi + |Ni|Q)xi +
∑
i∈N
uTi xi,
implying that the system is OFP with passivity index
maxi {µ1(Qi + |Ni|Q)}.
This completes the first step of proving passivity of the
propagation dynamics in order to design the patching strategy
to remove all malwares at a desired rate.
C. Design of Static Patching Strategies
If the compromise rates λS,v are known for all S and v, then
the results of Lemma 2 and Theorem 5 can be used to select
the patching rates {βi : i ∈ N} while minimizing a desired
cost function. The following proposition provides a sufficient
condition for removal of all viruses at a desired rate .
Proposition 1: Let Bi = βiI(2|V |−1)×(2|V |−1), where I
denotes the identity matrix, and let B be a block diagonal
matrix with the Bi’s as diagonal entries. Define Q by
Q = A⊗Q+
 Q1 · · · 0... . . . ...
0 · · · Qn
 .
where A is the adjacency matrix of the network, and ⊗ is
Kronecker product. If B − Q ≥ I , where “≥” denotes
inequality in the semidefinite cone, then all viruses will be
removed in steady-state and ||x(t)||2 ≤
√|N |e−t for all
t ≥ 0.
Proof: Using the storage function W (x) = 12x
Tx,
Theorem 5 implies that
W˙ (x) ≤ xTQxT − xTBxT ≤ −xTx.
7Therefore, from Theorem 1, we have
||x(t)||2 ≤ e−t||x(0)||2 ≤
√
|N |e−t,
since
∑
S x
S
i (0) ≤ 1.
Proposition 1 implies that an optimal patching strategy can
be selected using semidefinite programming, with the problem
formulation
minimize
∑
i∈N ci(βi)
s.t. B ≥ Q+ I
βi ≥ 0 ∀i,
(12)
where the cost function of patching for host i, ci is an
increasing, convex function in βi.
When the infection parameters λS,v are known, the op-
timization problem (12) can be used to select an efficient
mitigation strategy. In general, however, these parameters
will be unknown. One approach to incorporating unknown
infection rates is through robust variations on (12), which
would select the minimum-cost mitigation strategy over a set
of possible mitigation strategies. Alternatively, an adaptive ap-
proach can be designed that dynamically adjusts the patching
rate based on previously observed infections. Developing such
an approach is the focus of the next section.
V. PATCHING-BASED ADAPTIVE MITIGATION
This section presents two adaptive strategies for tuning the
patching rate based on previous detections of infected hosts.
The convergence of the patching rate and infection probability
are analyzed for both rules.
A. Adaptive Patching Strategy
As in the previous section, we take a passivity-based
approach to designing the patching strategy; the approach,
however, is based on an equivalent representation of the
malware propagation dynamics with different input and output.
We define the probability that host i is infected with at least
one malware at time t as x¯i(t) and the probability that host i
is infected with virus v as x¯vi =
∑
S3v x
S
i . We use the state
dynamics of xi =
∑
S x
S
i under the independence assumption
derived in Theorem 4 as
x˙i = (1− xi)
∑
j∈Ni
∑
v∈V
λ∅,v xvj − βixi.
Proposition 2: The dynamics of xi are passive from input
u where ui = (|Ni|λˆ− βi) to output y where yi = (xi)2.
Proof: Define the storage function W (x) =
1
2
∑
i∈N (xi)
2 and λˆ =
∑
v∈V λ
∅,v . Differentiating with
respect to time gives
W˙ (x) =
∑
i∈N
xi(1− xi)
∑
v∈V
∑
j∈Ni
λ∅,v xvj −
∑
i∈N
βi(t)(xi)
2
≤
∑
i∈N
xi(1− xi)
∑
j∈Ni
λˆxj −
∑
i∈N
βi(xi)
2
≤
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Ni
λˆxixj −
∑
i∈N
βi(xi)
2
≤
∑
(i,j)∈E
λˆ
2
((xi)
2 + (xj)
2 −
∑
i∈N
βi(xi)
2
=
∑
i∈N
(|Ni|λˆ− βi)(xi)2,
thus proving passivity.
The passivity of the propagation dynamics implies that, in
order to ensure convergence to the state where all viruses are
removed, it suffices to select an update rule β˙i(t) that is passive
from input (xi)2 to output (|Ni|λˆ − βi) by Theorem 2. One
such adaptive rule is given by
β˙i(t) = αxi (13)
for some α > 0. This patching strategy can be implemented by
incrementing the patching rate by αβi(t) when an infection is
detected. This is because the rate of this patching update pro-
cess is βi(t)x¯i(t) at time t, which leads to the rate of change
in the patching rate being equal to αβi(t)βi(t)x¯i(t) = αxi(t).
The adaptive patching does not require the knowledge of the
propagation rate λv , but requires that βi(0) > 0.
Theorem 6: Under the patching update rule β˙i(t) = αxi(t),
limt→∞ xi(t) = 0 for all i ∈ N , implying that all malwares
are removed asymptotically from the network.
Proof: Let x be the vector enumerating x¯vi for all i ∈ N
and v ∈ V . The proof is via the LaSalle Invariance Principle
(Theorem 3). Define the storage function W (x, β) by
W (x,β) =
1
2
∑
i∈N
(xi)
2 +
∑
i∈N
Γi(βi),
where
Γi(βi) =
{
1
2α (|Ni|λˆ− βi)2, βi ≤ |Ni|λˆ
0, else.
By inspection, W is positive semidefinite, and continuously
differentiable, and therefore is a valid storage function. We
now show that W˙ (x,β) ≤ 0. By Proposition 2,
W˙ (x,β) ≤
∑
i∈N
(|Ni|λˆ− βi)(xi)2 +
∑
i∈N
Γ˙i(βi)
=
∑
i∈N
[
(|Ni|λˆ− βi)(x2i − x¯i)
]
.
We show that each term of the inner summation is bounded
above by zero. If βi ≤ |Ni|λˆ, then, the corresponding term is
given by
(|Ni|λˆ− βi)((xi)2 − xi) ≤ 0,
since (xi)2 ≤ xi for xvi ∈ [0, 1]. On the other hand, if
βi > |Ni|λˆ, then the corresponding term is simply (|Ni|λˆ −
βi)(xi)
2 ≤ 0.
By the LaSalle’s Invariance Principle, all trajectories of
(x,β) converge to {(x,β) : W˙ (x,β) = 0}. We show that
this set is equal to {(x,β) : x = 0}. Since
W˙ (x,β) =
∑
i∈N
xi(1− xi)
∑
v∈V
∑
j∈Ni
λ∅,vxvj −
∑
i∈N
βi(t)(xi)
2
+
∑
i∈N
Γ˙i(βi),
we have W˙ (0,β) =
∑
i∈N Γ˙i(βi). However Γ˙i(βi) =
−(|Ni|λˆ−βi)x¯i for βi < |Ni|λˆ and 0 for βi ≥ |Ni|λˆ, resulting
in Γ˙i(βi) = 0 if xi = 0. Moreover, suppose there exists (x,β)
such that W˙ (x, (β)) = 0 and x¯vi > 0 for some i and v. Since
x¯i ≥ xvi > 0, we have β˙i = αx¯i > 0. Thus βi will increase
8at (x,β), and hence such (x,β) cannot stay in the set where
W˙ = 0. Therefore, W˙ (x,β) is identically 0 if and only if
x = 0.
B. Adaptive Patching Rate Analysis
We now analyze the time required for the adaptive patching
rate to converge to βi(t) = |Ni|λˆ. As an approximation, we
assume that the malware propagation xvi (t) instantaneously
converges to a fixed point, denoted svi (β), and that x
v
i instan-
taneously converges to fixed point si. The reasoning behind
this assumption is that when the patching update parameter α
is small, then the dynamics of patching and filtering update
will be on a much slower timescale than the timescale of
the malware propagation. This assumption is made in the
adaptive control literature [22] for the tractability of analysis.
We validated this accuracy of this assumption in Figure 4 (b)
in Section VII.
Under this assumption, we have β˙i(t) = α
∑
v∈V s
v
i (β). In
order to bound the convergence rate, we derive a lower bound
on svi as follows. We have that (1− si)
∑
v
∑
nj∈Ni λ
∅,vsvj =
βisi, and hence the union bound
∑
v s
v
j ≥ sj implies that (1−
si)
∑
nj∈Ni λminsj ≤ βisi. Summing over i and rearranging
terms yields∑
i∈N
λmin|Ni|si ≤ 2
∑
(i,j)∈E
λminsisj +
∑
i∈N
βisi
≤
∑
i∈N
|Ni|λmin(si)2 +
∑
i∈N
βisi.
We then arrive at the lower bound∑
i∈N
si(λmin|Ni| − βi − |Ni|λminsi) ≤ 0.
Based on this inequality, we take the approximation si ≥|Ni|λmin−βi
|Ni|λmin , leading to the dynamics
β˙i(t) = α
∑
v∈V
svi ≥ α
∑
v∈V
1
|Ni|λmin (|Ni|λmin − βi).
The resulting lower bound on βi(t) is then given by
βi(t) ≥ |V ||Ni|
λ
+
(
βi(0)− |V ||Ni|
λ
)
exp
(
−α |V ||Ni|λmin t
)
.
Next, we consider the final value of βi that is reached after
the infection rates converge to zero. The approach is to upper
bound xi(t), leading to an upper bound on β˙i(t) and hence
on βi(t). Since βi is nondecreasing over time, we have
x˙i(t) ≤
∑
j∈Ni
λmax(1− xi)xj − βixi
≤ λmax
∑
j∈Ni
xj − βi(0)xi,
which can be expressed in matrix form as x˙(t) = (λmaxA−
B0)x(t) where A denotes the adjacency matrix of the network
and B0 is a diagonal matrix with βi(0) on the i-th diagonal
entry. Hence
x˙(t) ≤ e(λmaxA−B0)tx(t) ≤ e(λmaxA−B0)t1.
Applying this bound gives∑
i∈N
β˙i(t) ≤
∑
i∈N
∑
v∈V
αe(λmaxA−B0)t1
= α1T e(λmaxA−B0)t1 ≤ α|N |eµ1(λmaxA−B0)t,
where µ1(λA−B0) denotes the maximum eigenvalue of the
matrix (λA−B0). Integrating yields∑
i∈N
βi(t)−
∑
i∈N
βi(0)
≤ |N |α|µ1(λmaxA−B0)| (1− exp (−|µ1(λmaxA−B0)|t))
giving a final value
∑
i∈N β
∗
i ≤
∑
i∈N βi(0) +|N |α
|µ1(λmaxA−B0)| .
This bound depends on the value of βi(0), and is valid
whenever βi(0) > λmax|Ni|. We therefore have∑
i∈N
β∗i
≤ min
1,...,N
{
|N |α
|µ1(λmaxA−B0)| +
∑
i∈N
(λmax|Ni|+ i)
}
,
where i = βi(0)−λmax|Ni|. We apply the Greshgorin Circle
Theorem [23] to obtain a lower bound
|µ1(λmaxA−B0)| ≥ min {i : i = 1, . . . , n}.
We have that∑
i∈N
β∗i ≤ min

{ |N |α

+ λmax|E|+ |N |
}
= λmax|E|+ 2|N |
√
α.
This gives an average β∗i value of approximately λmaxdavg +
2
√
α, where davg is the average degree of the network.
C. Non-Monotone Patching Strategy
The adaptive patching strategy (13) results in a patching
rate that is monotone nondecreasing in time, and hence may
overshoot the malware propagation rate. We now present a
patching strategy that can drive the probability of infection
to an arbitrarily small final value without exceeding the
propagation rate λ, in the single-virus case. The patching
dynamics are defined by
β˙i(t) = {αxi(t)− γ(1− xi(t))}+. (14)
This patching strategy can be implemented by incrementing
βi(t) by αβi(t) when an infection is detected at host i, and
decrementing βi(t) by γβi(t) when inspection of host i reveals
that no virus is present.
Taken together with the single-virus propagation dynamics
x˙i(t) = λ(1− xi(t))
∑
j∈Ni
xj(t)− βi(t)xi(t),
we have that the steady-state values for the infection proba-
bility and patching rate are given by x∗i =
γ
α+γ and β
∗
i =
α
α+γ |Ni|λ, respectively. Hence, the probability of infection
9can be set arbitrarily low, and the patching rate can be set
arbitrarily close to the propagation rate, by decreasing γα .
The local stability of these patching dynamics is governed
by the following theorem.
Theorem 7: The fixed point (x,β) with x∗i =
γ
α+γ and
β∗i =
α
α+γ |Ni|λ for all i ∈ N is asymptotically stable.
Proof: Linearizing the system around this fixed point, we
obtain the Jacobian matrix
A =
(
A − γα+γ I
(α+ γ)I 0
)
,
where I denotes the |N |×|N | identity matrix and A is defined
by
Aij =

−|Ni|λ, i = j
λα
α+γ , nj ∈ Ni
0, else.
We now show that the matrix A is Hurwitz. By Lyapunov’s
Theorem, a necessary and sufficient condition is to construct a
symmetric positive definite matrix P such that ATP +PA =
−I for some  > 0.
First, note that A is symmetric and is negative definite by
the Gershgorin Circle Theorem. We select a matrix P as
P =
(
τA
−1 (α+γ)
2γ I
(α+γ)
2γ I
γ
(α+γ)2 τA
−1 − 2γA
)
,
with τ = − 12
(
+ (α+γ)
2
γ
)
. It can be shown that ATP +
PA = −I . Furthermore, P is symmetric since the matrices
A and A
−1
are symmetric. It remains to show that P is
positive definite. We apply the Schur complement theorem,
which states that P is symmetric if and only if
1
τ
A
−1
> 0, and (15)
γ
(α+ γ)2
τA
−1 −
(

2γ
+
(
(α+ γ)
2γ
)2
1
τ
)
A > 0, (16)
where “>” denotes inequality in the positive definite cone.
Eq. (15) holds since A is negative definite and τ < 0. After
simplifying, eq. (16) holds since γ > 0 and A is negative
definite. Then there exists a positive definite matrix P such that
the Jacobian matrix A satisfies ATP + PA = −I , implying
that the linearized system matrix A is Hurwitz and the fixed
point is asymptotically stable.
VI. ADAPTIVE PACKET FILTERING-BASED MITIGATION
This section presents an adaptive rule for packet filtering-
based mitigation. Under the rule, the probability of filtering
each packet q is increased with each malware packet that
is detected. We first formally define the adaptive filtering-
based mitigation strategy, and then analyze the convergence
rate and overhead. A joint analysis of patching and filtering-
based mitigation is also presented.
A. Adaptive Filtering Strategy
The first step in developing the adaptive filtering strategy is
to analyze the passivity of the propagation dynamics when the
output is equal to the information available to the packet fil-
tering defense, namely, the rate of packets exchanged between
hosts i and j. These passivity properties are analyzed in the
following proposition. As a preliminary, define λ
v
= qµv .
Proposition 3: The multi-virus propagation dynamics are
passive from input ((λvmax − λ
v
) : v ∈ V ) to output (yv(t) :
(i, j) ∈ E, v ∈ V ), where
yv(t) =
∑
(i,j)∈E
µv(xvi (1− xvj ) + xvj (1− xvi ))
and µv is the rate at which malware v sends packets to
neighboring nodes.
Proof: Define a storage function by
W (x) =
1
2
n∑
i=1
∑
v∈V
(xvi )
2.
We then have
W˙ (x) ≤
∑
v∈V
n∑
i=1
xvi
 ∑
j∈N(i)
λvmax(1− xvi )xvj
−
∑
v∈S
∑
j∈Ni
u
(1)
ij µ
vxSi (1− xvj )
 ,
where λvmax = max {λS,v : v /∈ S}. Furthermore, we have
that ∑
w∈S
µwxSi (1− xwj ) ≥ µvxSi (1− xvj )
for any v ∈ S, and hence
W˙ (x) ≤
∑
v∈V
∑
(i,j)∈E
λvmax(x
v
i x
v
j (1− xvi ) + xvi xvj (1− xvj ))
−
∑
v∈V
∑
(i,j)∈E
qµv((xvi )
2(1− xvj ) + (xvj )2(1− xvi )).
Now, since 2xvi x
v
j ≤ (xvi )2 + (xvj )2, we have that
W˙ (x) ≤
∑
v∈V
∑
(i,j)∈E
(λvmax − λ
v
)
(
(xvi )
2(1− xvj )
+ (xvj )
2(1− xvi )
)
.
This completes the proof of passivity.
Proposition 3 implies that the propagation dynamics are
passive from input (λ − λ) to output yv . We consider the
filtering probability update rule
q˙(t) = γ
 ∑
(i,j)∈E
∑
v∈V
µv(xvi (1− xvj ) + xvj (1− xvi ))

q<1
,
(17)
where {f(x)}q<1 = f(x) if q < 1 and 0 otherwise. This
update rule can be implemented by incrementing q(t) by γq(t)
whenever a malware packet is detected, since q(t) and γ are
known parameters at each time t. To show that this update
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rule results in (17), we observe that the rate of the filtering
update process is given as
q(t)
 ∑
(i,j)∈E
∑
v∈V
µv(xvi (1− xvj ) + xvj (1− xvi ))
 .
Therefore, by the same logic as the derivation of (13), incre-
menting the filtering probability by γq when q < 1 results in
the dynamics (17), which does not require the knowledge of
the propagation rate λv .
Theorem 8: The update rule (17) guarantees convergence of
xvi to 0 for all i ∈ N and v ∈ V .
Proof: Define a storage function W (x, q) by
W (x, q) =

1
2
∑
i∈N
∑
v∈V (x
v
i )
2
+ 12 (q − p¯)2, q < p¯
1
2
∑
i∈N
∑
v∈V (x
v
i )
2, q ≥ p¯.
Then W˙ (x, q) is bounded by
W˙ (x, q)
≤
∑
v∈V
∑
(i,j)∈E
µv(pv − q)((1− xvi )(xvj )2 + (1− xvj )(xvi )2)
+
∑
v∈V
∑
(i,j)∈E
µv(q − pv)((1− xvi )xvj + (1− xvj )xvi )
−
∑
i∈N
∑
v∈V
βi(x
v
i )
2 ≤ −
∑
i∈N
∑
v∈V
βi(x
v
i )
2 < 0
when q < p¯ and W˙ (x, q) < 0 when q ≥ p¯ as well. Hence,
the function W is strictly decreasing and converges to the set
{W˙ = 0}, which occurs exactly when xvi = 0 for all i ∈ N
and v ∈ V .
B. Convergence Rate Analysis
The convergence rate of the filtering probability to a suf-
ficiently large value will determine how quickly the network
defense is able to mitigate the malware propagation. In order
to analyze the convergence rate, we divide the time required
for all viruses to be removed into two intervals. The first time
interval is the time for q(t) to increase until it approaches
pvmax; this can be interpreted as the time required to “learn” the
correct filtering strategy. The second time interval is the time
required for all viruses to be removed after q(t) has reached
this threshold value.
For simplicity, we define β = mini∈N βi, β¯ = maxi∈N βi
and p¯ = maxS,v pS,v , p = minS,v pS,v . Similarly p¯v =
maxS p
S,v and pv = minS pS,v . We analyze the time required
for q(t) to approach (pvmax− βi). Let {rvi (q) : i ∈ N, v ∈ V }
denote a fixed point of xvi when q(t) is constant and equal to
q; when q is small, there exists such a fixed point with rvi > 0
for all i ∈ N and v ∈ V . In order to analyze the convergence
rate of q(t), we adopt an approximation where the dynamics
of xvi converge instantaneously to r
v
i for all i and v.
Under this approximation, the dynamics of q(t) are
q˙(t) ≈ γ{
∑
v∈V
∑
(i,j)∈E
µv
(
(1− rvi (q))rvj (q)
+(1− rvj (q))rvi (q)
)}
q<1
. (18)
A lower bound on the convergence time is described as
follows.
Proposition 4: The filtering probability q(t) satisfies
q˙(t) ≤ γ|V |β¯
p− q
(
min
i∈N
|Ni|+
(|N | −mini∈N |Ni|)λmax − β
µmin(p− q)
)
(19)
when q(t) ≤ p.
Proof: Denote m = |V |, n = |N | and dmin =
mini∈N |Ni|. We have that
q˙(t) =
∑
v∈V
γ
∑
(i,j)∈E
µv(rvi (1− rvj ) + rvj (1− rvi )),
which can be bounded as
q˙(t) =
∑
v∈V
 γ
pv − q
∑
(i,j)∈E
µv(p
v − q)(rvi (1− rvj ) + rvj (1− rvi ))

≤
∑
v∈V
 γ
pv − q
∑
(i,j)∈E
( ∑
S:v/∈S
pS,vµv(rSi (1− rvj ) + rSj (1− rvi ))
)
=
∑
v∈V
γ
pv − q
∑
i∈N
βir
v
i ,
where (20) follows from the fact that rvi is a fixed point of
the dynamics of xvi .
Next, an upper bound on
∑
i∈N βir
v
i is derived. At the fixed
point,
βir
v
i =
∑
S:v/∈S
∑
j∈Ni
λS,vrSi r
v
j −
∑
S3v
∑
w∈S
∑
j∈Ni
qµwrSi (1− rwj )
≤ λvmax(1− rvi )rvj −
∑
S3v
∑
w∈S
∑
j∈Ni
qµwrSi (1− rwj )
≤ (1− rvi )λvmax
∑
j∈Ni
rvj − qµvrvi
∑
j∈Ni
(1− rvj )
Rearranging terms yields
rvi ≤
λvmax
∑
j∈Ni r
v
j
βi + λvmax
∑
j∈Ni r
v
j + qµ
v
∑
j∈Ni (1− rvj )
=
λvmax
∑
j∈Ni r
v
j
βi + (λvmax − qµv)
∑
j∈Ni r
v
j + qµ
v|Ni|
≤ λ
v
max
∑
j∈Ni r
v
j
βi + (λvmax − qµv)
∑
j∈Ni r
v
j + qµ
v|Ni|
Summing over i then gives∑
i∈N
rvi ≤
nλvmax − (β + qµvdmin)
λvmax − qµv
.
Combining with (20), we have
q˙(t) ≤
∑
v∈V
[
γβ¯
pv − q ·
nλvmax − (β + qµvdmin)
µvp¯v − qµv
]
≤
∑
v∈V
[
γβ¯
pv − q ·
nλvmax − (β + qµvdmin)
µvpv − qµv
]
≤ γβ¯m
p− q
(
dmin +
(n− dmin)λmax − β
µmin(p− q)
)
,
completing the proof.
The upper bound on q(t) can be used to analyze the time
required for the filtering probability to converge to p.
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C. Final Value of Filtering Probability
The filtering probability q(t) is a monotone increasing
function that is bounded above by 1, and hence converges to
a value q∗ = limt→∞ q(t). If this final value is approximately
equal to p¯, then the network will filter just enough packets to
ensure that all viruses are removed. On the other hand, if q∗
is approximately equal to 1, then almost all packets (including
non-malware packets) will be inspected, increasing the delays
experienced by legitimate network traffic. In what follows, we
analyze the value of q∗ as a function of the parameters γ and
β.
Proposition 5: The final value of q(t) satisfies
q∗ ≤ min
{
p¯+ |V |γ
∑
i∈N
|Ni|
βi
, 1
}
. (20)
Proof: By inspection of (17) and the fact that (1−xvi ) ≤
1, we have that
q˙(t) ≤ γ
∑
v∈V
∑
(i,j)∈E
(xvi + x
v
j )

q<1
(21)
= γ
{∑
v∈V
∑
i∈N
|Ni|xvi
}
q<1
(22)
≤ γ
{∑
v∈V
∑
i∈N
|Ni|e−βit
}
, (23)
where (23) follows from the upper bound xvi (t) ≤ e−βit when
q > p¯. This yields
q(t) ≤ q(0) +
∑
v∈V
∑
i∈N
|Ni|γ
βi
(
1− e−βit).
The expression can be simplified by noting that q(0) = p¯ and
the inner summation of the second term has no dependence
on v. The fact that q˙(t) = 0 when q = 1 then implies (20).
The following Corollary shows that when both adaptive
patching and filtering are employed, all malwares are removed
independent of the initial values of βi(0), q(0) and update
parameters α, γ as long as these parameters are positive.
Corollary 2: Joint adaptive patching and filtering guarantee
convergence of x¯i = 0 for all i ∈ N for any q(0) > 0, and
βi(0) > 0.
Proof: Define the dynamics of x¯i with only adaptive
patching as ˙¯x(p)i and the dynamics of joint adaptive patching
and filtering as ˙¯x(p),(f)i . Since
˙¯x
(p),(f)
i = ˙¯x
(p)
i −
∑
v∈V
q(t)µvx¯vi
∑
j∈Ni
(1− x¯vj ),
and
∑
v∈V q(t)µ
vx¯vi
∑
j∈Ni(1 − x¯vj ) ≥ 0 for all x¯vi and
q(t) > 0, we have ˙¯x(p),(f)i ≤ ˙¯x(p)i . Since q(t) > 0 for all
t for q(0) > 0 since q(t) is a monotonic non-decreasing
function in t. Therefore, for the same initial point x¯i(0),
the trajectory of x¯(p),(f)i (t) with joint patching and filtering
will be upper bounded by the trajectory of x¯(p)i (t) with only
filtering. However, Theorem 6 shows that under x˙(p)i , x¯i(t) will
converge to 0 for all initial points x¯i(0) ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore,
the joint adaptive patching and filtering guarantee convergence
to x¯i = 0.
VII. SIMULATION STUDY
In this section, we conduct a numerical study via MatlabTM.
We conduct three numerical studies. First, we compare the
mean-field approximation with the underlying Markov process
by comparing the trajectories in the static patching case.
Second, we simulate the adaptive patching strategy where the
patching rate for host i is incrementally increased when the
infection of host i is detected, as well as the adaptive filtering
strategy jointly employed with static patching. Finally, we
conduct a numerical study for the non-monotonic increasing
adaptive patching strategy proposed in Section V-C.
We assume there are two viruses v1, v2 propagating through
the network, and the infection rates are given as λS,{v1} =
λ1 = 1 and λS,{v2} = λ2 = 2 for all sets S ⊂ {v1, v2} in
the coexisting case, and the same infection rates are given as
λ∅,v1 = λv2,v1 = 1, λ∅,v2 = λv1,v2 = 2 in the competing
case. For the comparison between Markov process and mean-
field approximation, we considered a Erdos-Renyi graph with
100 hosts and probability of connection p = 0.2. We assume
that initially, each host is infected with either malware 1 or
2 with probability 0.4. To simulate the underlying Markov
process, we used Monte-Carlo methods with 100 trials. Fig-
ure 3 validates that mean-field approximation provide good
approximation of the underlying Markov chain for both the
competing and coexisting cases. It also shows that mean-
field approximation with independence assumption provides an
upper bound on the trajectories of x¯i(t) as proved in Theorem
4. Figure 3 also illustrates that when β values are chosen to
satisfy the passivity index conditions shown in Theorem 5, it
is sufficient to remove all malwares at desired rates.
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Fig. 3. Figure comparing the Markov process and the mean-field approxima-
tion with independence assumption. In both competing and coexisting cases,
mean-field approximation provide good approximation while providing upper
bounds on the trajectory of x¯i(t) which is consistent with Theorem 4.
The convergence of patching rates for the non-decreasing
adaptive patching strategy for different α values are shown
in Figure 4 (a) for both competing and coexisting cases. The
network configuration is same as the static patching rate case,
and the initial β values were set to 10 for all hosts. Figure 4
(b) validates the assumption of the instantaneous convergence
to the fixed point in Section V-B. The errors introduced by the
instantaneous convergence assumption is negligible from the
actual trajectory βi(t).
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The effectiveness of the adaptive filtering strategy with static
patching rate of βi = 10 for all hosts are illustrated in Figure
5. Propagation rates λ1, λ2 are same as the static patching
rate and the network was chosen to be a Erdos-Renyi random
graph with p = 0.2. Initially, each host is infected with either
virus 1 or 2 with probability 0.3. Figure 5 (a) shows that all
malwares are eventually removed from the network. Smaller
update parameter γ results in low final values of q(t) (Figure
5 (b)) at the cost of longer time to remove all malwares.
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Fig. 4. (a): illustration of the effectiveness of adaptive patching strategy.
Higher values of α ensures faster convergence rate to the final value at the
cost of higher final patching rates at the equilibrium. (b) Comparison between
the estimated patching rate with the instantaneous convergence assumption in
Section V-B and the actual trajectory of β.
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Fig. 5. (a) Figure illustrating the effectiveness of adaptive filtering strategy.
Adaptive filtering strategy is employed jointly with a static patching strategy
with rate βi = 10 for all hosts. Smaller values of γ results lower final values
of q at the cost of higher peak number of infected hosts and longer time
till all malwares are removed. (b) Effectiveness of non-monotone patching
strategy. Probability of infection asymptotically converges to the equilibrium
point computed in Theorem 7.
Figure 5 (a) verifies that the adaptive patching strategy in
Section V-B removes all malwares from the network. Large
update parameter α ensures faster convergence to the desired
steady state at the cost of higher final average patching rate at
the equilibrium, resulting in unnecessarily high patching rates.
The non-monotone adaptive patching rule (Figure 5 (b)) was
evaluated as follows. We considered propagation of a single
virus in an Erdos-Renyi random graph with 100 hosts and
p = 0.05. The propagation rate was λ = 1, while α = 1
and γ = 0.1. For each host, the initial infection probabilities
and patching rates were chosen independently and uniformly
at random from [0, 1] and [0, 0.2], respectively. The trajectory
of xi(t) for i = 1, 2, 3 is shown in Figure 5(b). Each of the
three trajectories converges to the fixed point γα+γ from the
initial state. We observed this behavior in all independent trials
that were run, leading us to conjecture that convergence to the
desired steady-state occurs from any initial state and hence is
not a purely local phenomenon.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated static and adaptive mitigation
strategies against propagation of multiple competing and coex-
isting malwares. We developed a passivity-based framework,
and proved that patching and filtering-based defenses can be
analyzed and designed jointly by modeling them as coupled
dynamical systems. In the case where the malware propagation
rates are known a priori, we characterized the needed patching
rate as a passivity index of the dynamical model. We formu-
lated the problem of selecting the minimum-cost mitigation
strategy to remove all viruses at a desired rate by leveraging
the derived passivity index.
When the propagation rates are not known a priori, we
presented adaptive mitigation strategies that vary the rate of
patching a host, or the probability of filtering a packet, in
response to the observed malware infections. We developed
two adaptive patching strategies, namely, a monotone increas-
ing patching rate that guarantees removal of all viruses in
steady-state, as well as a non-monotone patching rate that
can approximate the propagation rate to any desired accuracy
by varying the mitigation parameters. We also presented an
adaptive packet filtering strategy for removing all viruses.
The adaptive update strategies presented in this paper in-
volve each host updating its own patching rate based on
its observed infection probability. In future work, We will
investigate generalizations to other propagation models, such
as Susceptible-Infected-Recovered. Also, while we showed
that joint adaptive patching and filtering remove all malwares,
finding the optimal tradeoff between two mitigation strategies
by tuning the update parameters is an open research problem.
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